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The four-state continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) protocol has a long practical secure
distance [1], while it has the difficulty of parameter estimation. We propose an improved four-state proto-
col, where the covariance matrix can be estimated from experimental data without using the linear channel
assumption, and thus ensuring its unconditional security in the asymptotical limit. Our new scheme keeps the
advantages of high reconciliation efficiency and long secure distance of the four-state protocol, and it can be
implemented under current technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most prac-
tical application of quantum information, which allows two
remote parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a sequence of se-
cure keys [2]. Continuous-variable quantum key distribution
(CVQKD) encodes information into the quadratures x and p
of the optical field, and extracts it with homodyne detections,
which usually have higher repetition rate than that of single-
photon detections. So, CVQKD can potentially generate se-
cure keys with higher speed. Historically, CVQKD protocols
are at first based on squeezed states [3, 4]. Later, coherent
state protocols with Gaussian modulation were found to be
more practical choices [5, 6]. Both protocols have been ex-
perimentally demonstrated [7, 8] and have been shown secure
against arbitrary collective attacks [9, 10], which are optimal
in the asymptotical limit [11].
One remaining problem is that the reconciliation efficiency
β is quite low for Gaussian modulation, especially when the
transmission distance is long. As mentioned in [1], this is the
main limiting factor of the secure distance. There are two pos-
sible ways to solve this problem. One is to build a good rec-
onciliation code with reasonable efficiency even at low SNR
(signal to noise ration), which has been achieved very recently
[12]. The other is to use discrete modulation, such as the four-
state protocol, proposed by Leverrier et al. [1]. In this proto-
col, Alice randomly prepares one of the four coherent states:
|αm〉B = |αei(2m+1)π/4〉B with m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and sends to Bob.
Then, Bob randomly measures the x or p quadrature of the
signal pulse as his result, the sign of which encodes the bit of
the raw key. Since the sign of quadrature has discrete possi-
ble values, there exist very good error correction codes when
extracting I(a : b), even for extremely low SNR. From this
viewpoint, the four-state protocol combines the high reconcil-
iation efficiency of discrete modulation and the security proof
of CVQKD together, and improves the secure distance effec-
tively.
However, in this scheme, Alice and Bob can not estimate
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the covariance matrix from their experimental data without
the linear channel assumption (LCA) in practice. In the
entanglement-based (E-B) scheme of the four-state protocol,
the projection measurement {|ψm〉〈ψm |,m = 0, 1, 2, 3} Alice
performs only helps to discriminate which coherent state is
sent to Bob, but does not measure the quadratures of her mode.
So, Alice and Bob are not able to evaluate the covariance ma-
trix γAB from experimental data unless using the LCA, which
compromises the security of the protocol. To solve this prob-
lem, Leverrier et al. modified their protocols by introducing
decoy states [13], such that
pρkey + (1 − p)ρdecoy = ρG, (1)
where ρkey is the state sent to Bob in the four-state protocol
and ρdecoy is the decoy state. Alice randomly prepares ρkey
and ρdecoy with probability p and 1−p, respectively, so that the
mixed state sent to Bob is Gaussian, ρG. The main difficulty
of this method is the decoy state ρdecoy can not be accurately
prepared.
In this paper, we proposed an improved four-state proto-
col by modifying its entanglement-based (E-B) scheme, the
covariance matrix of which can be directly evaluated from ex-
perimental data without using the LCA, and its corresponding
prepare and measurement (P&M) scheme is not difficult to im-
plemented under current technology. Using discrete coding,
the high reconciliation efficiency and long secure distance can
be kept in this protocol.
II. THE IMPROVED ENTANGLEMENT-BASED SCHEME
OF THE ORIGINAL FOUR-STATE PROTOCOL
In this section, we introduce the improved E-B scheme of
the original four-state protocol. In practice, CVQKD proto-
cols are implemented in the P&M scheme, and the secure key
rate against collective attacks can be calculated by
KR = βI(a : b) − S (b : E), (2)
where KR is the secure key rate using reverse reconciliation,
I(a : b) is the classical mutual information between Alice
and Bob, S (b : E) is the quantum mutual information be-
tween Bob and Eve, and β is the reconciliation efficiency.
2FIG. 1: (color online) Preliminary model for improving the E-B
scheme. Alice prepares mixed states ρAB, measures x and p of her
mode, and sends the other to Bob. Then, Bob measures the quadra-
tures of his mode with homodyne detection. Though this model can
not generate secure keys directly, it is very enlightening.
I(a : b) can be directly estimated from experimental data,
while S (b : E) should be estimated using its equivalent E-
B scheme. In the E-B scheme of original four-state protocol
[1], Alice prepares
|ΦL〉AB =
1
2
3∑
m=0
|ψm〉A |αm〉B, (3)
measures mode A with {|ψm〉A〈ψm |}, and sends mode B to Bob,
where {|ψm〉A} are orthogonal states and m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. As
mentioned above, the main difficulty of this E-B scheme is
parameter estimation, where Alice’s measurement {|ψm〉〈ψm |}
only helps her to discriminate which state is sent to Bob, but
does not provide any information about the quadratures of her
mode. Comparatively, in the E-B scheme of Gaussian modu-
lation protocols [14], Alice prepares EPR pairs, and measures
her mode with heterodyne detection, which not only projects
Bob’s mode into coherent states, but also provides the infor-
mation about the quadratures of Alice’s mode, with which Al-
ice and Bob are able to estimate the covariance matrix γAB
from their experimental data.
Our improvement is to substitute {|ψm〉A} with proper states
{|ψ′m〉A}. Obviously, there are at least two conditions that
|Φ′〉AB =
∑3
m=0 Cm |ψ′m〉A|αm〉B should satisfy, where Cm is the
normalization coefficient:
1. Alice’s mode {|ψ′m〉A} can be discriminated by homo-
dyne or heterodyne detections, with which Alice are
able to measure the quadratures of mode A and the co-
variance matrix γAB can be estimated from experimental
data.
2. The covariance matrix of |Φ′〉 should be as close to that
of Gaussian state as possible, which ensures the secure
bound is tight, since the Gaussian optimality theorem is
used when calculating S (b : E).
From this viewpoint, the original E-B model in Eq. (3) satis-
fies condition 2, since its covariance matrix is close to that of
EPR state, especially when the modulation is small. Its main
drawback is that Alice does not use homodyne or heterodyne
detections, which does not satisfies condition 1.
A natural choice for |ψ′m〉 is coherent states, |ψ′m〉 = |βm〉 =
|βei(2m+1)π/4〉, where β is real and m = 0, 1, 2, 3. When β is
large, states {|βm〉} can be discriminated by heterodyne detec-
tion approximately. However, in this case, Alice’s measure-
ment projects Bob’s state ρ′B into a superposition of coherent
states, which is different from the ρB of the original four-state
protocol, and its equivalent P&M scheme is difficult to imple-
ment in real experiment.
A. The Mixed-state Scheme
To avoid the problems above, we consider that Alice pre-
pares mixed state ρAB and measures x and p of mode A simul-
taneously with heterodyne detection, where
ρAB =
1
4
3∑
m=0
|βm〉A〈βm| ⊗ |αm〉B〈αm|. (4)
As illustrated in Fig. 1, Alice projects mode B into a classical
mixture of coherent states, which can be implemented in its
P&M counterpart. Then, Bob randomly measures x or p of
mode B with homodyne detection to extract the information.
In this scheme, ρB is identical to that of original four-state
protocol in Eq. (3) [1]. To calculate S (b : E), we recall that
the covariance matrix γAB of ρAB is defined by
(γAB)i j = Tr[ρAB{(rˆi − di), (rˆ j − d j)}], (5)
where the elements of displacement vector di and d j are 0 in
this scheme. Without difficult calculation, we find the covari-
ance matrix of ρAB has the form that
(
VAI CABI
CABI VBI
)
, (6)
where VA and VB are the variances of mode A and B, and CAB
are their correlations. After channel transmission, the covari-
ance matrix is changed to
(
VAI
√
ηCABI√
ηCABI η(VB + χ)I
)
, (7)
where η and χ = (1−η)/η+ǫ are the channel parameters. Both
parameters can be estimated from experimental data. Here,
for the ease of theoretical research, we suppose the channel
is linear, and η and ǫ are the transmittance and excess noise,
respectively. It should be emphasized that this assumption is
just for simplifying the simulation, but not necessary in this
scheme [15].
The classical mutual information I(a : b) can be calcu-
lated by 1 − H(e), where e is the bit error rate and H(e) is
the Shannon entropy. The calculation of S (b : E) is a little
more complex. To maximize Eve’s information, Eve is sup-
posed to purify the whole system ρAB and the quantum mutual
information S (b : E) is calculated by
S (b : E) = S (E) − S (E|b) = S (AB) − S (A|b), (8)
where S (AB) and S (A|b) can be derived from γAB, using the
Gaussian optimality theorem [16, 17].
It is not surprising that we can not acquire positive secure
key rate KR with this E-B scheme, and there are two reasons.
First, when calculating S (b : E), we suppose Eve is able to
3FIG. 2: (color online) The improved entanglement-based scheme.
Alice prepares pure states |Ψ〉FGAB, measures x and p of mode A with
homodyne detections and sends mode B to Bob.
purify the whole system to maximize the information leaked
to her. So, this scheme just overestimates Eve’s information,
since ρAB is initially in a mixed state, and it is not difficult to
find that S (b : E) > 0, even if the transmittance η is 1. Sec-
ond, the secure key rate in E-B scheme is related to how much
pure entangled pairs can be extracted from ρAB, while in this
E-B scheme, ρAB is separable and contains little entanglement.
Though Alice and Bob are classically correlated, they can not
distill secret information from experimental data. Neverthe-
less, this attempt is very enlightening for our improved E-B
scheme in the following.
B. The Improved Entanglement-based Scheme
In this subsection, we proposed our improved E-B scheme,
which is illustrated in Fig. 2. Instead of mixed state ρAB, Alice
prepares four-mode pure state |ΨI〉FGAB, where I denotes the
improved E-B scheme and its subsystem AB is identical to the
mixed state ρAB in Eq. (4), where
TrFG{|ΨI〉FGAB〈ΨI |} = ρAB.
The reason why we introduce two ancilla modes FG is to
guarantee that the pure state |ΨI〉FGAB does exist. In this
scheme, modes F and G are used as neutral parties, the in-
formation of which is controlled neither by Eve nor by Alice
and Bob. Alice measures x and p of mode A simultaneously
with heterodyne detection, and then sends mode B to Bob. It
is not difficult to verify that ρB in this case is identical to that
of the original four-state protocol. The classical mutual infor-
mation I(a : b) can be directly calculated by 1 − H(e), while
Eve’s knowledge about Bob’s data S (b : E) depends on the
covariance matrix of |ΨI〉FGAB. Certainly, we can derive the
exact expression of |ΨI〉FGAB and calculate its covariance ma-
trix, while using our previous technique [15], we find that this
work is not necessary.
To compute S (b : E), we consider a pure state
|ΨL〉FGAB = |0〉F |0〉G|ΦL〉AB, (9)
where |0〉 is the vacuum state and |ΦL〉AB is Leverrier’s E-B
model in Eq. (3). It is not difficult to verify the covariance
matrix of |ΨL〉FGAB can be written as
γ′FGAB =

I 0 0 0
0 I 0 0
0 0 VBI Zσz
0 0 Zσz VBI
,
 (10)
FIG. 3: (color online) The secure key rate of improved E-
B scheme. The lines from bottom to top correspond to ǫ =
0.002, 0.004, 0.006, 0.008 and 0.01, respectively.
where Z is the correlation between Alice and Bob’s quadra-
tures [1]. As shown in [19], since |ΨI〉AB and |ΨL〉AB are dif-
ferent purifications of ρB, there exist a unitary transformation
UFGA on mode F, G, and A, that
|ΨI〉FGAB = UFGA |ΨL〉FGAB, (11)
which does not change the mutual information S (b : E), since
UFGA is commuted with UBE , where UBE denotes Eve’s oper-
ation on mode B and E. So, we can safely calculate S (b : E)
by substituting |ΨI〉FGAB with |ΨL〉FGAB, the elements of which
are known. This result can also be understood physically. In
reverse reconciliation, Both Alice and Eve performs error cor-
rection according to Bob’s data. Whenever |ΨI〉 or |ΨL〉 is
used, the mode B sent to Bob is in the same state ρB. Since
Eve is not able to discriminate which E-B source is used, she
has to perform the same strategy to eavesdrop the information,
and the leaked information S (b : E) should be same.
Since |ΨL〉FGAB is a pure state, we have
S (E : b) = S (E) − S (E|b) (12)
= S (FGAB) − S (FGA|b)
= S (AB) − S (A|b),
where van Neumann entropies S (AB) and S (A|b) can be cal-
culated with the symplectic eigenvalues of covariance matri-
ces γAB and γbA [18].
The performance of our improved E-B scheme is illustrated
in Fig. 3, where we use α = 0.5 and β = 20. For small α,
the CM of |ΦL〉 is close to that of EPR state, which ensures
a high secure key rate. For large β, coherent states |βm〉 are
approximately orthogonal to each other, which are easier to
be discriminated by heterodyne detection. The variance of ex-
cess noise is set to be 0.002, 0.004, 0.006, 0.008 and 0.01,
respectively. The secure distance is a little shorter than that of
original four-state scheme, and this is mainly because coher-
ent states {|βm〉} can not be discriminated deterministically.
The reason why ρAB’s purification |ΨI〉FGAB can be used to
generate secure keys is based on two sides.
4First, |ΨI〉FGAB is a pure state, and Eve is not benefit from
her purification at the very beginning. It is not difficult to ver-
ify that S (b : E) = 0, when η = 1. Second, though ρAB con-
tains little entanglement, the whole system FGAB is generally
an entangled-state, which can be used to extract secure keys.
From this viewpoint, our improved E-B scheme just combines
ρAB’s advantages in parameter estimation and |ΦL〉’s advan-
tages in computing S (b : E) together, which ensures a long
secure distance.
III. THE PREPARE AND MEASUREMENT SCHEME
Though the E-B scheme is convenient for theoretical re-
search, it is difficult to implement directly. In this section,
we will present its equivalent P&M scheme. As mentioned
above, in the E-B scheme, Alice measures quadratures x and
p of mode A simultaneously. To do this, Alice should use a
50 : 50 beamsplitter to separate mode A into two parts, A1 and
A2, and the whole state is changed to
ρA1A2B =
1
4
3∑
m=0
| βm√
2
〉A1〈
βm√
2
|⊗| βm√
2
〉A2〈
βm√
2
|⊗|αm〉B〈αm|. (13)
Then, Alice measures x of mode A1, measures p of mode A2,
and projects Bob’s state to
ρB|xA,pA =
1
4
3∑
m=0
C(xA,pA)m |αm〉〈αm |. (14)
The coefficient C(xA ,pA)m is calculated by
C(xA ,pA)m = tr(MA2(pA)MA1 (xA)ρA1A2 (m)M†A1(xA)M
†
A2(pA)),
where operators MA1 (xA) = |xA〉A1〈xA|, MA2 (pA) = |pA〉A2〈pA|,
and ρA1A2 (m) = | βm√2 〉A1〈
βm√
2
| ⊗ | βm√
2
〉A2〈 βm√2 |. This is a classical
mixture of coherent states {|αm〉〈αm |}, where the probability
C(xA ,pA)m is a Gaussian function of Alice’s measurement result
(xA, pA). The calculation of C(xA ,pA)m is straight with the meth-
ods in [20], while we omit the detail here and and focus on
its experimental realization. In this section, we propose two
possible P&M schemes to implement this protocol. One is the
true random number generator (TRNG) based scheme and the
other is the beamsplitter based scheme.
A. TRNG based Scheme
In TRNG-based scheme, each time Alice uses TRNG1 to
generate random pairs (xA, pA) with probability
Pr(xA) = tr(MA1 (xA)ρA1 M†A1 (xA))
and
Pr(pA) = tr(MA2 (pA)ρA2 M†A2 (pA)),
FIG. 4: (color online) The TRNG based scheme of improved four
state protocol. Alice generates random numbers xA and pA with
TRNG1, and calculates {C(xA,pA)m }, based on which Alice randomly
prepares |αm〉B to generates ρB|xA ,pA . Bob extracts the information by
randomly measuring x or p of mode B with homodyne detection.
FIG. 5: (color online) The Beamsplitter based scheme of improved
four state protocol. Alice modulates coherent state with a phase mod-
ulator driven by TRNG2 with m = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, and separates it
into two parts with a beamsplitter. Alice measures the quadratures x
and p of one output state and sends the other to Bob.
respectively, where density operators ρA1 = trA2 B(ρA1A2 B) and
ρA2 = trA1 B(ρA1A2 B). To prepare ρB|xA,pA , Alice randomly pre-
pares a coherent state |αm〉B from {|αm〉B,m = 0, 1, 2, 3} with
probability C(xA ,pA)m and sends it to Bob. As illustrated in Fig.
4, the TRNG-based scheme can be realized within current
technology, while it is still a little complicated, since each
time two random numbers are generated and the probability
{C(xA ,pA)m } depends on the random pair (xA, pA).
B. Beamsplitter based Scheme
To simplify the experimental implementation, we pro-
pose a beamsplitter-based scheme. Noticing that ρAB =
1
4
∑3
m=0 |βm〉A〈βm| ⊗ |αm〉B〈αm|, we find it can be directly im-
plemented with a beamsplitter. As illustrated in Fig. 5, Alice
prepares a coherent state |γ〉, and modulates it with a phase
modulator, driven by TRNG2. Then, the modulated coher-
ent state is separated by a beamsplitter, the output states of
which are |βm〉A and |αm〉B, respectively. Then Alice measures
the x and p of mode A simultaneously, and sends mode B to
Bob. In this scheme, TRNG2 generates only 4 possible values
{m = 0, 1, 2, 3}, which are easier to implement than TRNG1
in Fig. 4.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
To sum up, we propose an improved long-distance CVQKD
protocol by modifying the E-B scheme. We find that the
mixed state ρAB is helpful to establish a classical correlation
5between Alice and Bob, and then purifies ρAB with two an-
cilla mode F and G as the improved E-B model, |ΨI〉FGAB .
The parameter estimation can be performed in this scheme
without using the LNA. Further, based on [15], we find the
mutual information S (b : E) of our improved scheme is iden-
tical to that of Leverrier’s one, so we can derive a security
bound for reverse reconciliation, without deriving the exact
expression of the ancilla states F and G. From this viewpoint,
our improved E-B scheme combines the high reconciliation
efficiency of discrete coding and the facility of parameter es-
timation together, and hence ensures a long secure distance
with unconditional security. Also, we present two potential
equivalent P&M schemes to implement the improved proto-
col experimentally.
There are also several remaining problems to study. First,
the E-B model |ΨI〉FGAB can be further optimized to make its
density matrix closer to that of a EPR, which may further im-
prove the secure key rate. Second, in four-state protocol, the
optimal value of α is less than 1, which is still not easy to
detect by homodyne detections in the experiment. At last, its
unconditional security against coherent attack need to be re-
considered when the finite size effect is taken into account.
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